Axis relations Vice Minister Chuichi Ohashi Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



136. Ambassador Oshima Analyzes Germany's Plans.



Ambassador Oshima also informed his Foreign Minister of his own opinions on May 18, 1941. In view of Germany's many peace offers he believed that when the aims of Mein Kampf were realized, reconciliation between England and Germany could be attained since England's influence had been eliminated from the continent, and would eventually be destroyed in Africa. However, he also believed that because of Germany's current hold on the continent,



(a) Germany was no longer interested merely in removing England's political influence from the European continent;

(b) Germany must incorporate within the Axis Africa (including the Mediterranean area) and the Near East;

(c) Germany having developed to that point, will consolidate; then prepare for the great struggle of the future between Germany and the United States. [554]



Ambassador Oshima also thought that Germany was considering the taking over of the British fleet, since in bringing about reconciliation it would not be necessary for Germany voluntarily to take a backward step.

Germany expected Japan to restrain the United States in the Pacific, and to keep the American fleet out of the Atlantic. If the Japanese-American negotiations permitted the United States to send its warships into the Atlantic, Germany could still lighten its terms and achieve a peace. If the German-Russian war materialized, this would be another reason for Germany's offering peace to England. Ambassador Oshima believed, however, that England would not submit to these terms since they would amount to nothing less than unconditional surrender. [555]

A Japanese report of June 27, 1941 declared that Herr Hess had brought a peace offer to England, based on the premise that Chancellor Hitler's real objective was to crush Russia and stamp out Communism. [556]



137. Ambassador Oshima Rebukes Foreign Minister Matsuoka.



In answer to a query of May 15, 1941 from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin concerning the basis for rumors of an approaching Japanese-American agreement, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Mr. Matsuoka replied on May 17, 1941 that information in regard to the negotiations had not been sent to Germany because of the need for secrecy. In the United States, only the President, the Secretary of State, and one other Cabinet official were cognizant of the negotiations, and even the United States Ambassador in Japan had not been informed. Mr. Matsuoka reassured Ambassador Oshima that his silence in this affair did not imply a lack of trust in the Ambassador, and informed him that he would be advised of the entire matter when things had developed to a certain stage. [557]

Ambassador Oshima speedily dispatched several long messages to Mr. Matsuoka in which he discussed the bad effect a Japanese-American agreement might have on the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Ambassador also expressed his wonder at Mr. Matsuoka's apparent disinterest in obtaining reports on the official attitudes of Italy and Germany to such an agreement. [558]



[554] II, 526-527.

[555] II, 527.

[556] II, 528.

[557] II, 529.

[558] II, 530-532.



117



138. Germany Attempts to Offset Japanese-American Negotiations.



In a long and important report of May 19, 1941 Ambassador Oshima informed Mr. Matsuoka that on May 3, 1941, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had learned of the Japanese-American negotiations from Ambassador Ott in Tokyo, and had immediately asked Ambassador Oshima to call on him. Ambassador Ott had reported the main points of the four articles of the agreement proposed to Japan by the United States on April 16, 1941, and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop informed Ambassador Oshima of his inability to understand the motives of the Japanese government. The Japanese Ambassador insisted that Japan would do nothing inconsistent with the Tripartite Pact. [559]

On May 9, 1941 Ambassador Oshima was again called to the German Foreign Office where the Foreign Minister told him of Japan's provisional reply to the American proposal. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop pointed out that the Japanese had originally proposed the negotiations; Japan had become deeply involved by this time; a certain group in Japan was influential enough to force Mr. Matsuoka into the negotiations; and, furthermore, the Japanese Foreign Minister had changed his mind about attacking Singapore.

The German Foreign Minister expressed his doubts as to the sincerity of President Roosevelt, and also commented on the possibility that Japan was seeking a loophole to escape its obligation to fight in accordance with the Tripartite Pact. These negotiations, which were weakening the Tripartite Pact, might also cause Japan to lose the opportunity of gaining supremacy in East Asia. As to Japan's course of action concerning the pending agreement, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop favored the first of two German proposals that (a) Japan should reject the United States' proposal, or (b) Japan should consent to an agreement only on the condition that the United States would abandon its plan for convoy and patrol services, and would maintain absolute neutrality. [560]

Ambassador Oshima stated that his government would prefer the second proposal since this would make Britain fight Germany single-handedly and, thus, would hasten the end of the war. He also hoped that President Roosevelt might seize the opportunity to stop giving aid to Great Britain because this policy had proved to be ineffective. Ambassador Oshima realized that this was a remote possibility, but felt that in any event the second proposal would test President Roosevelt's sincerity in regard to aid to England, and at the same time it would convince certain Japanese of the impossibility of Japanese-American cooperation.

Herr von Ribbentrop disagreed with the Japanese Ambassador by pointing out that the negotiations gave the United States an opportunity to draw Japan away from Germany, and also might be used to silence American groups advocating peace since a Japanese-American understanding would give the United States a free hand in the Atlantic. However, the German Foreign Minister promised to send Ambassador Oshima's opinion, together with the two proposals, to Chancellor Hitler, who was living outside of Berlin at that time. As soon as Chancellor Hitler approved the plans, Germany would take up direct negotiations with Italy concerning the Japanese-American negotiations. [561]



139. Germany and Italy Disturbed by Japanese-American Negotiations.



Carrying out previous arrangements to visit Premier Mussolini, Ambassador Oshima left for Rome on May 10, 1941, the day after his interview with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.



[559] II, 531.

[560] II, Ibid.

[561] II, Ibid.



118



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



Two days later, the German Ambassador O. Furst von Bismarck, acting under instructions from his Foreign Minister, called on Ambassador Oshima to show him the German government's instructions to Ambassador Eugene Ott in Tokyo. Both Italy and Germany had concurred in the statement which outlined the second of the German proposals, the one which Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had opposed. Chancellor Hitler had approved this second proposal, which had won the support of Ambassador Oshima.

Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop arrived by plane to confer with Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano in Rome on May 13, 1941, and on the morning of May 14, 1941, he conferred with Ambassador Oshima. Expressing great dissatisfaction with Mr. Matsuoka's explanation as to why the Japanese-American negotiations had been started without awaiting Italian and German views, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop stated that if Mr. Matsuoka had waited only a few hours longer before replying to the United States he would have received their opinions.

Ambassador Oshima declared that he did not know the facts of the situation, but thought that his Foreign Minister's action was due to the necessity of assuring absolute secrecy, and because the Emperor's approval had to be obtained. No disrespect had been intended for either Italy or Germany.

The German Foreign Minister was very disturbed because Foreign Minister Matsuoka had not mentioned the Japanese-American negotiations during his recent trip to Germany, despite the fact that they had a great bearing on the Tripartite Pact. Herr von Ribbentrop did not disguise his opinion that the negotiations had weakened the Pact, that President Roosevelt was not to be trusted, that Japanese negotiations with the United States should be abandoned, and that he did not approve of the German proposal which had received the support of Chancellor Hitler.

On the evening of this same day, Ambassador Oshima conferred with Foreign Minister Ciano who expressed views similar to those of the German Foreign Minister. [562]



140. Germany Alleges That Mr. Matsuoka Promised Japan's Aid in a War Against Russia.



When Ambassador Oshima returned to Berlin on May 17, 1941, he was requested to call on Vice Minister Weizsacker. Acting under instructions from Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, the Vice Minister showed Ambassador Oshima a telegram from Ambassador Ott in Tokyo dealing with the Japanese reply to the United States' proposal, and Germany's instructions to Ambassador Ott concerning this reply. The German Vice Minister expressed his government's great concern with the outcome of this question, and stated that Germany was greatly interested in Foreign Minister Matsuoka's statement to Ambassador Ott that Japan would aid Germany in case of a German-Russian war.

When asked whether Mr. Matsuoka was fully acquainted with German-Russian relations, Ambassador Oshima replied that his Foreign Minister had had many opportunities to talk with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop concerning these relations during his visit to Germany. As for the Japanese position in the event of a German-Russian war, all important questions of state had to be approved by the Emperor, and, consequently, any statement by Foreign Minister Matsuoka was merely an expression of his own personal views. [563]

In another report on May 19, 1941, Ambassador Oshima stressed Germany's dissatisfaction with regard to the proposed Japanese-American agreement. Germany was concerned over the



[562] II, Ibid.

[563] II, Ibid.



119



future of the Tripartite Pact, because its official circles felt that Japan's entrance into an agreement with the United States would be the same as giving approval to the violent anti-Axis actions of the United States. Although the agreement might prevent the entrance of the United States into the European war, it would indicate to the German people that Japan was evading its duty to enter the war. After the warm welcome awarded to Mr. Matsuoka on his recent visit, and the strengthening of ties among Axis nations, many Germans felt that they had been betrayed by the recent action of Japan. [564]

Ambassador Oshima recognized the fact that Japan needed a political and economic breathing spell which could be brought about by settling the China incident, but he pointed out that Germany and Italy were winning the European war and, therefore, it would be unwise for the sake of some immediate gains to lose the friendship of the Axis powers. Ambassador Oshima emphasized Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's belief that the agreement proposed by the United States was motivated only by its desire to separate Japan from the Axis. If Japan left the Axis, it would stand alone in international affairs during the critical period immediately following the war. If Japan abandoned its plan to expand southward and discontinued its threat to Singapore, Ambassador Oshima believed that Japan would be looked upon contemptuously not only by Britain and the United States, but by Germany and Italy as well. [565]

Furthermore, a Japanese-American agreement would mean that Japan was abandoning its claims to the establishment of a "New Order" in Greater East Asia, and the Japanese people would become confused as to the ultimate national goal. While very much opposed to any Japanese-American negotiations, Ambassador Oshima suggested that if Japan felt it necessary to enter into an agreement, the following points should be put into effect:



(a) Japan was entering into an agreement with the United States to support the spirit of the Tripartite Pact and to make things easier for Germany and Italy in their war against England.

(b) America was to change her policy with regard to the European war to one of strict neutrality at the same time that Japan clearly set forth the conditions of the Tripartite Pact under which it would be bound to enter the war.

(c) Germany and Italy should not be permitted to think that certain Japanese groups, urging the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East as opposed to expansion of the militarists, had gained so much power that Japan had been forced to enter into an agreement with America. [566]



Ambassador Oshima also stressed the need for exchanging opinions with Germany and Italy so that they could be reassured of Japan's intention to adhere to the Tripartite Pact. [567]



141. Japan Stresses Its Allegiance to Axis.



On May 24, 1941 Mr. Matsuoka replied that he could understand the reasons for Ambassador Oshima's agitation over the negotiations, but reiterated that Japan would do nothing to contravene the spirit of the Tripartite Pact which was the cornerstone of Japan's national policy. According to Mr. Matsuoka, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and other German officials should have no anxiety or misunderstanding concerning Japanese acts. [568]

The Japanese Foreign Minister stressed that in view of the measures he had taken since he had returned to Japan, and because of the statements made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull, the United States was well aware of the Japanese determination to support the



[564] II, 532.

[565] II, Ibid.

[566] II, Ibid.

[567] II, 532-533.

[568] II, 534.



120



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



Tripartite Pact. Stating that he did not know what was in the back of President Roosevelt's mind, and remarking that no one else did either, Foreign Minister Matsuoka agreed in general with the assumption of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that London and Washington were attempting to separate the Axis powers by diplomacy. [569]

Commenting on the fact that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop was disturbed because Japan had begun the negotiations with the United States before receiving any views from Germany, Mr. Matsuoka pointed out that he had delayed his answer almost four weeks from the date of the original proposal by the United States. On May 8, 1941 Tokyo had received a confidential report that the American Congress had approved the convoy policy, and that President Roosevelt was to approve it on May 14, 1941. Since Japan had been anxious to prevent the United States from approving convoys in order to eliminate the danger of American participation in the war, the Japanese counter proposal had been suddenly put forth on May 12, 1941. [570]

Mr. Matsuoka denied that he had acted in response to pressure from any Japanese group, and again insisted that his reason for not informing the Germans was to maintain security. The Japanese counter proposal had been successful because President Roosevelt had postponed his speech scheduled for May 14, 1941. Defending his position of withholding information, the Japanese Foreign Minister said he would continue to keep in touch with the Germans and Italians, but since Japan was a free country it was unnecessary to run to Germany and Italy for advice on every problem. [571]

In Moscow, Ambassador Yoshitsugu Tatekawa had learned in mid-May 1941 from the American Ambassador that conversations had started between Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Foreign Minister, possibly in regard to the question of the United States' aid to China. He had informed the American Ambassador, who had stressed the impossibility of a Japanese-American war, that if a war between America and Germany were provoked by the American fleet, Japan was obligated by the terms of the Tripartite treaty to fight against America. [572]



142. Foreign Minister Matsuoka Attempts to Prevent German-Russian War.



On May 27, 1941 Mr. Matsuoka denied that in a conversation with Ambassador Ott he had promised Japan's entrance into a German-Russian war. According to the Japanese Foreign Minister, he had indicated the impossibility of foretelling the attitude of Japan in such an event, though he had said that he could not visualize Japan's not striking at Russia, if Germany went to war. [573]

On the following day, May 28, 1941, Ambassador Oshima was ordered to deliver the following message to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop:



In view of the current international situation which so deeply involves my country, and of the internal situation within Japan, this minister sincerely hopes that the German Government, insofar as is possible, will avoid a military clash with the Soviet. [574]



Mr. Matsuoka continued trying to avert a Russian-German war until the outbreak of hostilities, and though he seemed to realize the futility of his efforts on June 20, 1941, he still hoped for a change in Germany's attitude. [575]



[569] II, 535

[570] II, Ibid.

[571] II, Ibid.

[572] II, 536

[573] II, 537.

[574] II, 538.

[575] II, 539-540.



121



143. Japan Informs Its Diplomats of the Japanese-American Negotiations.



On May 27, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Office informed its diplomats in Moscow, England, France, and Italy of the Japanese-American negotiations which were in progress in Washington. According to this message, Japan had entered negotiations with a view to maintaining the Tripartite Pact as the basis of its national policy, preventing the United States from convoying ships to England or from entering the war, and lastly, having the United States cease its aid to China. Important details of the proposed agreement were outlined, and a warning to keep the negotiations secret was issued. [576]



144. Japan Loses by Economic Collaboration with Germany.



Adherence to the Tripartite Pact in conjunction with its "New Order in East Asia" was beginning, as early as May 1941, to cause Japan no little concern over its already heavily burdened shipping. Conditions in Europe and South America had made the purchase and leasing of ship bottoms exceptionally difficult, and conversion of merchant vessels for military use had cut Japan's commercial shipping to sixty per cent of its former capacity. Accordingly, on May 12, 1941, Mr. Matsuoka informed Ambassador Oshima in Berlin of the great sacrifice Japan would be forced to make, if Germany were furnished additional aid. [577]

Not only in regard to shipping was Japan suffering losses for the sake of its alliance with Germany, but its all-important rubber markets in French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies and Thailand were cornered by German merchants, who operated without regard to price. By mid-May 1941, the situation had become so acute that some Japanese factories were shut down, thereby forcing a request to Ambassador Ott that Germany permit Japan to appropriate one half of the new consignment of rubber from French Indo-China which was scheduled to arrive soon in Japan for reshipment. This amount would be replaced as quickly as conditions permitted. [578]

Negotiations with Germany in regard to increasing Japan's tin allotment were also under way, but though experiencing a shortage, Japan agreed to purchase and refine one hundred and fifty tons of ore for consignment to Italy. [579] Since German newspapers were also manifesting a great interest in Japanese-Dutch trade negotiations, Japanese authorities feared that some jurisdictional dispute concerning Greater East Asia might occur. [580]

Not until June 20, 1941, after further bargaining, was the Japanese request answered by the Chief of the German Commerce Bureau in Berlin. According to a new proposition, Japan was to receive twenty-five hundred tons of rubber; there would be no further hindrance to its purchase of rubber from Indo-China and Thailand; and the amount left over, after shipments had been made to the United States and France, would be divided between Japan and Germany. [581]



[576] II, 541.

[577] II, 542.

[578] II, 543-544.

[579] II, 545.

[580] II, 546

[581] II, 547-548.



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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



145. Strengthening of Japanese-German Political Ties.



Despite its economic losses from collaboration with Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Germany in the Far East, Japan continued to cement diplomatic relations by doing favors for the Germans. In late May 1941, Tokyo directed its Minister in Mexico to receive $200,000 in American money from the German Minister for transfer to Berlin, via a Japanese ship to Tokyo. [582] But in turn a request was made by Tokyo, on June 9, 1941, that Major General Takuma Shimoyama be received at Berlin in the newly created position of Military Attaché for Aviation. [583]



146. Japanese-Italian Collaboration.



Japanese-Italian solidarity was fostered through the Japanese Foreign Office and through the cultural activities of the Japanese International Cultural Advancement Society. [584] In order to awaken Italian interest in Japan, the Japanese Ambassador in Rome requested that an increased amount of Japanese publications be sent from Tokyo every twenty days. [585] In addition he discouraged any efforts toward furthering Japanese trade in Italy, and for this reason he advised that the head of a Japanese trade promotion office, who was disliked by his fellow Japanese in Rome, was considered unsuitable to fill the Commercial Attaché post. [586]

According to a Japanese report, Germany had agreed that when the Axis had conquered Europe, Italy was to dominate the Mediterranean and Egypt. [587]



147. Japanese Estimate of German Strength (June 3, 1941).



On June 3, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin reported that Hitler would conclude the war as soon as possible after a great battle which would take place in any of the following forms:



(a) A direct attack and occupation of England proper;

(b) A complete sweeping away of English power from the Eastern Mediterranean;

(c) A war embracing Iraq;

(d) North African battle taking place in Egypt and Suez;

(e) The taking of Gibraltar;

(f) A war in the territory surrounding Dakar;

(g) Finally, a war against the Soviet. [588]



Germany's plans to pulverize the British Empire, and at the same time to defend German boundaries, impressed Ambassador Oshima and his economic and military attaches, who believed that Germany could also annihilate the Russian army within a short period. [589]

It was estimated, in this same report of June 3, 1941, that the German naval, air and army forces numbered from 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 men, 10,000 to 15,000 first class fighter planes, 20,000 second class fighters, 30,000 training and civilian aircraft, and monthly production amounting to 2,000 planes. Only 40,000 men had been killed in all battles since the beginning of the war. Aircraft and submarine production dominated the Axis industrial output, for the Germans had been very successful in their attacks on English shipping by these methods. [590]



[582] II, 549.

[583] II, 550-551.

[584] II, 552.

[585] II, 553.

[586] II, 554.

[587] II, 555.

[588] II, 556.

[589] II, 557.

[590] II, 558.



123



A Japanese summary of German war reports from June 1 to June 15, 1941 announced the destruction of 177,400 tons of British shipping by aerial attack, and 128,800 tons by submarine. [591]

Though sincerely believing in the powerful "New Order" in Germany and its ability to wage war, Ambassador Oshima observed that the German people, in general, desired peace, despite Chancellor Hitler's ambition to bring England to annihilation. [592] Chancellor Hitler had informed Ambassador Oshima that Great Britain had invited Germany to join with her in clamping down on Italy in 1935, but suspecting that after the subjugation of Italy, Germany's downfall would follow, he had refused. [593]



148. Germany Protests Against Criticism by Japanese Press.



Although the Japanese press, according to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on June 4, 1941, was releasing articles in an attempt to divorce Japan and Germany, actually the Japanese Empire continued more and more solidly to support the Hitler program, since apparently it was much impressed by German success. Attempting to vindicate his government, Ambassador Oshima explained to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that though the rigid control exercised over the press in Germany did not exist in Japan, the Japanese thoroughly supported the Tripartite principles. [594]



149. Croatia Signs the Tripartite Pact.



Croatia was invited on June 5, 1941 to join the Tripartite powers. Dr. Ante Pavelic of Zagreb was to be Premier and Foreign Minister of this newly recognized government. Arrangements were made to have the agreement signed in the presence of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Venice on June 14, 1941. [595]



150. Japan Assists an Axis-Supported Indian Revolutionary.



Japan was interested in the activities of Mr. Subhas Bose, a leader of a group of the Congress Party, who after deportation from India, had been living in Berlin. [596] Learning from the Italian Foreign Office, on June 4, 1941, that Mr. Bose was in Rome but had not as yet conferred with Premier Mussolini or Foreign Minister Ciano, Japan planned not to make a public commitment, since it felt that he might not be a capable revolutionary leader. [597] However, Japan offered to act as liaison between Mr. Bose and his party of a million supporters in the province of Bengal. [598]



151. Germany's Attitude Toward Portugal (June 1941).



Although in early June 1941 Spain was expected to join the Tripartite Pact, German authorities did not believe that Hitler would exert pressure on Portugal to make it follow suit. [599]



[591] II, 559.

[592] II, 560.

[593] II, 561.

[594] II, 562.

[595] II, 563.

[596] II, 564-565.

[597] II, Ibid.

[598] II, 565.

[599] II, 566.



124



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



152. Japan Congratulates Germany on the Fall of Crete.



Great accomplishments of Germany in World War II were the landing of troops on Crete early in May 1941, and the final annexation of the island in June 1941, after some unexpected resistance. [600] In referring to the Battle of Crete, Hitler told Ambassador Oshima that victory had been obtained entirely by new aerial tactics and that twelve thousand prisoners had been captured and eight battleships destroyed. [601]

On June 6, 1941 Ambassador Zenbei Horikiri in Rome called to congratulate Foreign Minister Ciano on the Axis conquest of Crete. Further moves against Alexandria and the Suez Canal were suggested by Ambassador Horikiri, who also expressed his belief that defeat of the British Isles would not be too difficult. In reply, Foreign Minister Ciano stated that Britain's home defenses, its fleet and air arms would make invasion somewhat costly. Furthermore, any move in North Africa would not be without a struggle. [602] As final resistance crumbled in Crete, however, the swiftly moving German Luftwaffe began to bomb Alexandria, Haifa and Cyprus. [603]



153. Vichy Begins to Collaborate with Germany. [604]



Tokyo was informed as early as May 10, 1941, that current discussions were facilitating German-French collaboration. [605] Negotiations between German authorities and Vice Premier Darlan were expected to culminate in new and better relations between these two governments. On May 14, 1941 Ambassador Kato at Vichy reviewed the Darlan-Hitler conference on May 12, 1941. According to a German Foreign Office staff member, the meeting of the two leaders had ensured German-French political and military cooperation. Collaboration would include Germany's use of sea and air bases in the French colonies in North Africa, supply lines in Syria and the French Navy. In return France was to be assured of the preservation of its Empire and colonies. [606] The authoritative German spokesman also predicted that Admiral Darlan, rather than Mr. Pierre Laval, would originate all further policies concerning Germany and France, since conversations between Admiral Darlan and Chancellor Hitler had been conducted at Berchtesgaden in a most amiable atmosphere. [607]

As proof of the friendly relations between the two governments, France obtained the release of 100,000 prisoners on May 19, 1941, as well as a reduction in the maintenance cost of Germany's army of occupation to 240,000,000 francs per day. [608] Ambassador Kato believed that the German-Vichy negotiations had been quite successful, and he remarked that Marshal Henri Petain's address of May 15, 1941 would influence French opinion in favor of Germany.

According to the Japanese Ambassador, relations between the United States and France took an unexpected turn for the worse after President Roosevelt, in a statement on May 15, 1941, had warned France against collaboration with Germany, and had then ordered guards to be placed aboard eleven French ships, including the Normandie, which were in American ports. Furthermore, Marshal Petain informed Ambassador Leahy that the assistance accorded France by the United States was not sufficient. [609]



[600] II, 567.

[601] II, 561.

[602] II, 568.

[603] II, 559.

[604] See Japanese-French Relations, Part C. Sections 198-199.

[605] II, 569.

[606] II, 570.

[607] II, 555.

[608] II, 571.

[609] II, Ibid.



125



The Japanese Ambassador at Rome stated on June 7, 1941 that France was expected to contract a peace treaty with Germany and Italy, and at the same time the questions of Croatia and Nice would be settled. Since French leaders were reported as ready to sign the Tripartite Pact, Japanese authorities believed that this would aid them in the Japanese-French Indo-China economic situation. [610]



154. Great Britain Opposes Vichy.



Meanwhile, the Japanese Ambassador in London, following his talk with the British Foreign Minister on or about June 6, 1941, had reported on British-French sentiment. Though recognizing that Mr. Pierre Laval, Admiral Darlan and Marshal Petain wished most ardently that Great Britain would follow Vichy and would assist in bringing about an early peace in Europe, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden announced that Great Britain was determined to finish the war, even though it had to act alone. He believed, however, that the biggest part of the French populace was not with Vichy in spirit. [611]

Three divisions of British troops, with some deGaullists and Abyssinians, invaded Syria in early June 1941, and according to Ambassador Kato's report of his conversation with General Huntziger, the French Minister of War, French defenses were exceptionally weak. However, the French Minister believed that the British advance could be temporarily halted. [612] Japanese sources from Turkey reported that despite French efforts to render assistance, Axis negotiations with Turkey for the transport of arms through Turkish territory had come to naught, and as a result, Syria would fall under the rule of British forces. [613]



155. Japanese Concern Over British Control of Iraq.



It was apparent to Japanese representatives that Axis interests in Iraq would be impeded by the new pro-British government, which had been established by Emir Abdul Illah to succeed the Cabinet of Premier Rashid Ali el Gailani, whose Iraqi Army, composed principally of doubtful Kirkuk-Mosul troops, had been crushed by the British. [614] Japanese agents in the Near and Middle East felt that unless Germany and Italy immediately counteracted the British influence, the whole Arabian movement of the Axis might be severely imperiled.

Ambassador Horikiri expressed his concern about Syria and Iraq to Foreign Minister Ciano on June 6, 1941. [615] This fear was well founded, for, on June 4, 1941, a definite rupture between Iraq and Italy had occurred, when Minister Muzahim Al-Pachachi, residing in Rome, had received orders to return home. To maintain Japanese harmony with Iraq, Japanese representatives in Rome were urged by their colleagues in Baghdad to finance the return of Minister Al-Pachachi. [616]



156. Turkey Signs Commercial Agreement with Germany.



Demands for support were made upon Turkey from all quarters as it attempted to preserve its neutrality. The Axis nations even considered the transfer of Syria to Turkey in exchange



[610] II, 672

[611] II, 573.

[612] II, 574.

[613] II, 575.

[614] II, 576-577.

[615] II, 578-580, 563.

[616] II, 581.



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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



for its support. However, as time passed, the Axis nations were encouraged by Turkey's attitude for the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin states, on May 22, 1941, that although Turkey had remained neutral, it was in fact becoming more closely allied with the Axis since it not only permitted Axis supplies to cross through Turkish territory, but was also expecting to be of assistance in an Axis move against India. [617]

On June 18, 1941 Turkey took an important step in staving off an attack from the west when German Ambassador Franz von Papen and Foreign Minister Shukru Saracoglu signed a Turkish-German Pact. Reporting the formulation of this pact to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Turkish Ambassador Tek, resident in Tokyo, was reassured by Mr. Matsuoka as to Chancellor Hitler's "high ideals" and also as to Turkey's good judgment in culminating such a treaty. Turkish diplomats took care to stipulate, however, that this treaty admitted no passage of troops through their neutral territory, though a comprehensive commercial pact would be contracted between Turkey and Germany. [618]



157. Japan Persuades Germany to Eliminate Pro-Chinese German Officials.



On July 3, 1941 Ambassador Oshima conferred with the German Ambassador to China, Henrich D. Stahmer, and requested that German officials in China, who were well known for pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese attitudes, be replaced by Germans who were more deeply imbued with the spirit of National Socialism. The German Ambassador agreed to present the matter to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and Ambassador Oshima's request for the names of anti-Japanese Germans was forwarded by Tokyo to all Japanese officials in China. [619]



158. German Merchants Seek Chinese Markets.



As time went on, Japanese officials became increasingly concerned with German policy in regard to its merchants in the Far East. Having learned from intelligence sources on July 9, 1941, that the German Economic Ministry had issued secret instructions to German merchants in Shanghai which would promote German control of trade, Mr. Matsuoka urged his representatives to impress upon Germany the need for a retraction of such orders, and to stress the necessity for fostering Japanese and German commercial equality. Should Germany not comply, Japan revealed that it would insist upon all of Japan's business being conducted through Japanese merchants. He urged that immediate action be taken to avert a serious break in relations. [620]

According to the Japanese, a group of German diplomatic officials was primarily concerned with its own immediate financial and commercial interests, and, therefore, Japanese restrictions on shipping, residence and transit in China had tended to create a consistently unfriendly attitude on the part of these men toward the Japanese Empire. [621] Another group of German officials, however, stressed the need for political concert between Germany, Japan and Manchukuo, but even this group, which had recognized the Nanking government and, thus, was able to negotiate with it, might also cause a delicate situation. [622]



[617] II, 567.

[619] II, 582.

[619] II, 583-584.

[620] II, 585.

[621] II, 586.

[622] II, Ibid.



127



On July 31, 1941 Tokyo urged Ambassador Oshima in Berlin to prevent situations leading to anti-Japanese and pro-Chungking conduct on the part of German merchants, such as the transfer of captured enemy shipping, and the violation of shipping rules. [623]



159. Japan Seeks a German-Nanking Commercial Agreement.



Looking forward to the establishment of a "New Order" in the Far East, Japan believed that a comprehensive agreement between Germany and China, with recognition of the leading positions of Japan and Germany, should be concluded at the end of the war. Since a large scale war in China was still under way, however, it seemed best that as individual questions came up, immediate friendly settlements should be made by an agreement between Japan, Germany and China. Several new clauses were to be added to the present German-Chinese treaty in order to grant special privileges to the signatories in the area in which they held leadership. [624] Complaints from the German Consul General in Shanghai were received at Tokyo in July 1941 concerning the treatment being accorded to Germans in China. Impressed by these complaints, Japan recognized the necessity for according favorable treatment to Germans in China in order to improve German relationships with the new Nanking government. [625] A simple agreement, stipulating a most favored nation treatment for Germans in China, was suggested, but Japanese representatives in Nanking and Shanghai were directed to deal adroitly with the situation to ensure the special position of the new Chinese-Mongolian border as an area of joint Japanese-Chinese policy. [626]



160. Japan Reports a Lull in Japanese-American Negotiations.



On July 17, 1941 Mr. Matsuoka declared that his government had not been pressing the United States for an understanding, and that no concrete action had been taken for a month after the United States had submitted its supposedly final proposal in late June 1941. During this period of delay, whenever the German and Italian Ambassadors to Tokyo had sought some information as to the contents of the United States proposal, Mr. Matsuoka had stated merely that the provisions were slipshod and were not acceptable. However, he had not discontinued the negotiations abruptly because they affected both the domestic and foreign policy of Japan. Declaring that any treaty reached with the United States would have to be based on the Tripartite Pact, he stated that there was very little chance of reaching an agreement. [626a] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The German Ambassador to Tokyo informed Vice Minister Chuichi Ohashi on July 22, 1941 that Germany opposed the Japanese-American negotiations, and in view of the successes of Germany in the Russian war, Japan had better decide immediately on its course of future action. Remarking that Japan would occupy Southern French Indo-China in the next few days, and that this seizure would be merely a preparatory step for future activities, Vice Minister Ohashi pointed out that Germany's insistence on influencing Japan's national policy might possibly have an adverse effect on Axis relations. [626b]